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Abstract 
Economic Value Added (EVA) has attracted considerable attention in academic 
research recently. The Stem Stewart & Co. that developed EVA claimed that 
"Economic Value Added is the financial performance measure that comes closer 
than any other to capturing the true economic profit of an enterprise." 
Many advocates claimed that EVA is a key performance index that motivates 
companies to find ways to increase efficiency of capital utilization and consequently 
produce a superior operating performance, and therefore should in theory reflect a 
stock's intrinsic value. Since featuring in popular financial literature in the early 
1990s, EVA has become popular in mainstream corporate circles as a performance 
measurement and corporate governance tool in the U.S. and around the world. Many 
past studies, however, suggest that EVA does not dominate traditional accounting 
earnings with stock returns and firm values. With few exceptions, these studies have 
concentrated on the relationship between EVA and stock returns as well as firm 
values in the U.S. Since the China and Hong Kong markets are quite different from 
that in U.S., this dissertation therefore aims to investigate how alternative market 
settings affect the performance of publicly listed firms in Hong Kong and China 
using EVA and other related measures. 
There are two phases in this dissertation. First, the data on EVA for firms in 
Hong Kong and China are compiled, which will be the starting point in valuing 
these firms using measures other than traditional variables. These measures have 
been argued to be useful for internal incentive purposes in a more developed 
economy, so it is of interest to see their use in Hong Kong and China markets which 
are quite different from the more developed economies. For example, the main 
forms of corporate governance in China and Hong Kong are state-owned and 
family-controlled respectively, which are quite different from most of the developed 
economies. Then the information contents of these measures are investigated by 
examining their association with the market value of the firms in such an alternative 
setting. The recent Asian financial crisis has raised a lot of concerns on such issues 
as weak corporate governance, commonly cited as the culprit of this crisis, is more 
prevalent in Hong Kong and China than in many other developed economies. This 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine if the firms in Hong Kong and China, 
which are often portrayed to have a governance mechanism that is different from 
that in other industrialized countries, ensure that management is value enhancing for 
shareholders by using Economic Value Added (EVA) as a performance measure. 
Financial theorists have long argued that the objective in managerial decision-
making should be to maximize firm value. Managers and practitioners have often 
criticized them for being too single minded about value maximization and for not 
considering the broader aspects of corporate strategy or the interests of other 
stakeholders. In the last decade, however, managers seem to have come around to 
the view that value maximization should be, if not the only, at least the primary 
objective for their firms. This tum-around can be partly attributed to the frustration 
that many of them have felt with strategic consulting and its failures, or partly to an 
increase in their ownership of equity in the firms that they manage. 
In light of the financial crisis in East Asia, it is timely and crucial to study 
issues related to markets in Asia. The Asia economies are different from the more 
developed economies. For example, their corporate governance, generally defined as 
institutional arrangements and mechanisms through which outside investors in the 
firm control the insiders of the firm to ensure returns on their investment, are quite 
different from the more developed economies. While there are some conventional 
measures of firm performance, they may not be reflective of the value added to 
shareholders' wealth. A number of measures have been proposed in the past decade 
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that claim to offer new insights to value enhancement, yet the issue how corporate 
governance impacts on shareholders' wealth is still unsettled. 
It is well known that there are two different models in corporate governance, 
the Anglo-American model and the German-Japanese model. In Hong Kong, large 
family holdings are perceived as playing a role in corporate governance, while the 
state and legal persons (institutions) are the main shareholders for the listed 
companies in China. This is only one of the differences between China/Hong Kong 
and other western economies such as U.S. that can be easily observed. There are 
other differences that may be more difficult to observe, such as practices in rules and 
regulations as well as cultural differences. This study investigates whether these 
different market settings significantly affect the performance of firms in Hong Kong 
and China. 
The recent Asian financial crisis has exposed the weakness of corporate 
governance in Hong Kong and China to certain extent. A number of governance 
structures, while mandatory in more developed economies, are voluntary in Hong 
Kong and China. These features should provide an alternative setting for our 
investigation. Furthermore, the stock markets in both Hong Kong and China appear 
to be quite volatile, and this casts some doubts of using stock returns as the measure 
of value added. EVA and other related metrics may provide an alternative choice of 
measuring the value created，and indeed some of these measures have gained 
supports from the practitioners. 
In this study, the data on EVA and related metrics for firms in Hong Kong and 
China are first compiled, which will be the first step in valuing these firms using 
measures other than traditional variables. The EVA measures have been argued to be 
useful for internal incentive purposes in a more developed economy, so it is of 
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interest to see their use in Hong Kong and China. The information contents of these 
measures are then investigated by examining their association with firm values in 
such an alternative setting. As the economies are emerging significantly over the 
years, Hong Kong and China should provide a rich setting to study these issues. 
Therefore, this study should shed light on how to measure shareholder value in an 
environment rather different from the other developed markets, thereby contribute to 
the academic literature as well as provide a basis for policy implications. 
The progression of the dissertation is as follows: A brief review of the relevant 
literature and discussion of the issues is presented in Chapter 2. The data and 
methodology are described in Chapter 3, with the empirical results presented in 
Chapter 4，followed by the summary and concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance 
In a recent document, OECD (1999) emphasizes that corporations should be run, 
first and foremost, in the interests of shareholders. While the ideology of shareholder 
value has become entrenched as a principle of corporate governance among 
companies based in the U.S. and U.K. over the past two decades, the rhetoric of 
shareholder value has become prominent in the corporate governance debate in 
Japan and many European countries in recent years. 
Industrial countries have relied on different mechanisms for corporate 
governance because of differences in their legal and regulatory frameworks and 
levels of market development. In the Anglo-American model, share ownership is 
dispersed, and unsatisfactory performance is sanctioned by shareholders selling 
shares or by hostile takeovers. In the German-Japanese model, core investors own 
significant stakes. Concentration of ownership provides core investors with both the 
incentive and the ability to monitor and control the management. Enterprise cross-
shareholding is another distinct feature. The first approach can be viewed as the 
market discipline approach and the second as the ownership control approach. 
Indeed, there has been heated debate on the benefits and drawbacks of the two 
approaches. 
Both approaches can find their theoretical foundations in the academic 
literature. Fama (1980) argues that if a firm is viewed as a set of contracts, 
ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept since a properly functioning 
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managerial labor market will discipline managers and solve incentive problems 
caused by the separation between ownership and control. Hart (1983) pointed out 
that competition in the product market reduces managerial slack and thus provides 
another disciplinary mechanism. Jensen and Ruback (1983) emphasized the role of 
the market for corporate control, while Martin and McConnell (1991) found that the 
takeover market has restricted non value-maximizing behavior of top corporate 
managers. 
However, economists argue that ownership matters because it affects the 
working of the markets. For instance, Grossman and Hart (1980) showed that if a 
firm's ownership is widely dispersed, no shareholder has adequate incentives to 
monitor the management closely because the gain from a takeover for any individual 
shareholder is too small to cover the monitoring cost. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
developed a model to demonstrate that a certain degree of ownership concentration 
is desired for the takeover market to work more effectively. Large shareholders are 
able to capture a chunk of the gains from monitoring and are likely to supply it at 
levels that would be otherwise impossible to reach in diffusely held firms. 
Other empirical analyses have presented mixed results regarding the debate 
on the market versus ownership approaches. Demsets and Lehn (1985) found no 
significant correlation between ownership concentration and profit rates for 511 
large corporations. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) reported a piecewise linear 
relationship of Tobin's Q with board member ownership for 371 Fortune 500 firms.' 
Holdemess and Sheehan (1988) analyzed 114 publicly listed firms in which a 
majority of shareholders owned at least 50.1% of the common stock. Tobin's Q is 
I Tobin's Q is in general defined as the ratio of the market value of the replacement value of the firm, 
which can be measured as the market value of equity and debts over replacement value of net fixed 
assets and inventory. 
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higher if most owners are corporations, whereas Tobin's Q and the accounting profit 
rates are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners. McConnell 
and Servaes (1990，1995) found that Tobin's Q is positively correlated with the 
fraction of shares owned by institutional investors. These studies along with others 
seem to suggest that: (1) there is a positive correlation between share holdings of 
large investors and a firm's performance, and (2) institutional investors appear to be 
more effective in monitoring a firm's performance than individual shareholders. 
Many of these studies have been primarily U.S. based, and obviously it is 
important to investigate these issues in other countries as well. Claessens, Djankov 
and Lang (1999, 2000) investigated the separation of ownership and control in 2,980 
publicly traded companies in nine East Asian countries, namely Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. They found extensive family control in more than half of East Asian 
corporations. They also found that in these East Asian Countries, corporate control 
is enhanced through pyramid structures, and cross-holdings among firms. 
Xu and Wang (1999) investigated whether ownership structure significantly 
affects the performance of publicly listed companies in China within the framework 
of corporate governance. A typical listed stock company in China has a mixed 
ownership structure with three predominant groups of shareholders 一 the state, 
legal persons (institutions), and individuals — each holding approximately 30 % of 
the stock. They found a positive correlation between ownership concentration and a 
firm's performance. In particular, a firm's profitability is positively and significantly 
correlated with the fraction of legal person shares, suggesting that large legal person 
shareholders (institutional investors) have the incentive and power to monitor and 
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control the behavior of the management and have played a significant role in 
corporate governance. 
With respect to Hong Kong, Wang, Au and Peng (2000) suggested that the 
extensive family control in Hong Kong and other Southeast Asia corporations, 
would make the directors (who are also large shareholders) of the corporations put 
their relatives into the management system of the corporations, and keep the other 
more able person with no relationship outside. They believe that that would harm the 
long-term development and profit of the firms. 
In a series of articles, Lang and Young (2001a, 2001b, 2001c) showed that the 
top 15 families in Hong Kong controlled companies with a total market 
capitalization equal to 84.2% of 1996 gross domestic product. The post-War surge 
of growth which occurred despite the absence of the Western institutions of the rule 
of law and democracy in East Asian was made possible because of the following 
substitutes: (1) business networks based on family and long-term associates that 
permitted complex transactions without a law of contact; and (2) the autocratic 
governments and effective civil services committed to the point where companies 
had to seek outside sources of finance to continue their growth. 
2.2 Measures of Value 
It has been documented in financial literature that accounting-based rates of return 
are poor measures of the true rate of return. For instance, Fisher and McGowan 
(1983) showed the inadequacy of accounting measures being good indicators for the 
actual returns. In the past decades, several other measures have been proposed and 
claimed to be better measures of firm value. 
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Stewart (1991) stated that the traditional accounting model of valuation 
contends that share prices are set when the stock exchange capitalizes a company's 
earnings per share (EPS) at an appropriate price/earnings (P/E) ratio. The appeal of 
this accounting model is its simplicity and apparent precision. The problem, 
however, is that the P/E ratio of a company changes all the time, due to possible 
acquisitions, changes in accounting policies or as investment opportunities arise 
(and/or disappear). This makes EPS as part of the P/E ratio method a very unreliable 
measure of value. 
The market is not fooled by cosmetic earnings increase, which can be achieved 
by accounting entries; only long-term earnings increase that correspond with 
improved long-term cash flow will increase share prices. There is substantial 
evidence supporting the view that the market uses a sophisticated approach to assess 
accounting earnings. Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) classify this evidence into 
three classes: (1) evidence that accounting earnings are not well correlated with 
share prices; (2) evidence that earnings window dressing does not improve share 
prices; and (3) evidence that the market evaluates management decisions based on 
their expected long-term cash flow impact, not in their short-term earnings impact. 
Hall and Brummer (1999) stated that the accounting model relies on two 
distinct financial statements — the income statement and the balance sheet 一 
whereas the economic model uses only sources and uses of cash. Whether a cash 
outlay is included in the income statement or capitalized in the balance sheet makes 
a big difference to the earnings amount reported. In the economic model, where cash 
flows are recorded makes no difference, unless that affects taxes. The economic 
model of valuation like Economic Value Added (EVA) holds that share prices are 
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determined in essence by just two things: the cash to be generated over the life of a 
business and the risk associated with the cash receipts. 
The recent shift of focus to value maximization has created an opening for 
investment bankers and consultants to come up with measures such as the EVA that 
may offer new insights into value enhancement. These measures aim to estimate 
how much of the value a company is creating, or destroying in an attempt to mark a 
trend to manage long-term economic value rather than solely relying on projected 
earnings per share. EVA-related performance metrics can be used for internal 
decision making as well as evaluating company and executive performance. Because 
of EVA'S focus on value created by management, it has been becoming a managing 
tool that has an impressive array of corporate advocates in the United States, which 
include Coca-Cola, AT&T, Quaker Oats, Eli Lily, Georgia Pacific, and Tenneco. It 
is also widely used as an equity analytical tool by investment banks such as Credit 
Suisse First Boston, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Societe Generale and some 
other reputable investment banks. 
Some early studies seem to support the view that EVA-related measures are 
better than traditional performance measures like ROA, ROE, etc., and conclude that 
the results attested to their effectiveness as performance measures. These studies 
include Stewart (1991，1994), Grant (1996)，Lehn and Makhija (1996) and Uyemura, 
Kantor and Pettit (1996) among others. On the other hand, studies like Chen and 
Dodd (1997), De Villiers (1997)，Storrie and Sinclair (1997), Chen and Clinton 
(1998) cast doubt on the usefulness of EVA. For instance, Biddle, Bowen and 
Wallace (1997，1998，1999) examined the relative and incremental information 
content of EVA, residual income, earnings and operating cash flow, and found that 
9 
although residual income and EVA add incremental information in some settings, on 
average neither of them dominates earnings as a performance measure. 
Fernandez (2001) analyzed 582 American companies using EVA, MVA, 
NOP AT and WACC data provided by Stem Stewart, and drew the conclusion that 
EVA is not the parameter that had the highest correlation with shareholder value 
creation. He also suggested that a policy of maximizing the EVA each year may not 
be positive for the company, as the EVA may increase for the following reasons: (1) 
increasing in the NOP AT，which may decrease the cash flow and the company's 
value (for example, when depreciation is less); (2) decrease in the cost of capital, 
which may decrease due to reasons that have nothing to do with management 
performance (for example, a drop in interest rates or in market premium); and (3) 
decrease in assets employed or a deferral of profitable investments. 
In concept, EVA is championed as the direct missing link to the three corporate 
returns: Shareholder returns, economic returns and accounting returns. Weaver 
(2001) did a survey on Stem Stewart & Co. clients, and found that none of the 29 
respondents measured EVA, NOP AT，or Invested Capital (INCAP) in the same way. 
From a menu of up to 164 adjustments, the average EVA proponent makes 19 
adjustments with a range between 7 and 34 adjustments, and limited consistency in 
adjustments occurs even within the same industry. 
While the debate on whether EVA is a better measure of firm performance 
remains unsettled, there seem to be a consensus that shareholder value measures 
such as EVA can significantly improve corporate decision making as in Biddle, 
Bowen and Wallace (1997，1998，1999) and Epstein and Young (1999). Fernandez 
(2001) also suggested that EVA, EP and CVA have advantage over book profit as 
they take into account both the resources used to obtain the profit and these 
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resource's (which determines their cost or required return), so they may be better 
management performance indicators than book profit and they may also be useful as 
benchmarks for their remuneration. 
Perhaps due to limitations in data availability, there have been limited studies 
of these issues in Asian countries. An exception is the study by Hu and Lu (2000) on 
non-financial companies listed in China issuing A-shares during 1994 to 1998. Their 
analyses indicate that while the earnings ability is declining over the period, there 
has not been a significant decline in the EVA. Furthermore, while there does not 
seem to be a significant difference for firms of different size within the same 
industry, the EVA measure does differ significantly across industries. 
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Chapter 3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
This study investigates all the firms listed in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
(SEHK), Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). 
Specifically, the data used in this study are extracted from the Pacific-Basin Capital 
Markets Database (PACAP) and the Taiwan Economic Journal China Data Bank 
(TEJ). The PACAP database is developed by the Sandra Ann Morsilli Pacific-Basin 
Capital Markets Research Center at the University of Rhode Island, which consists 
of historical capital markets data for 8 economies in the Pacific-Basin region 
including Hong Kong. The TEJ database was founded in April 1990 and specialized 
in financial data for firms of Taiwan and China. 
3.2 Economic Value Added (EVA) 
As discussed before, Economic Value Added (EVA) is a variation of the residual 
income (RI) concept, and is defined as the difference between a company's net 
operating income after taxes (NOPAT) and its capital charge 一 the amount of 
capital times the cost of capital. Stewart (1991) suggests that EVA is a fundamental 
measure of corporate performance that shows how efficient management is in 
turning investors' capital into profits, i.e., creating wealth. EVA exemplifies the 
axiom that it is the return in excess of the cost of capital, the cost or return required 
by investors on their provided funds used to create value: 
EVA = (Rate of Return - Cost of Capital) x Total Capital 
EVA = NOP AT - (Cost of Capital x Total Capital) 
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where (1) NOP AT is the profit derived from operations after taxes but before 
financing costs and non cash-bookkeeping entries; (2) total capital is cash invested 
net of depreciation, usually calculated as the sum of interest-bearing debt and equity 
or as the sum of net assets less interest-bearing current liabilities;' and (3) cost of 
capital is the weighted average cost of total capital. 
In order to make the necessary adjustments for some unintended distortions 
from accounting reporting requirements set for purposes not directly related to 
valuing, EVA unavoidably relies on some judgments from the analysts. Regardless 
of unanimous opinions with some specific cases, all EVA calculation protocol 
attempts to remove the accounting and timing distortions in earnings recognition by 
adding equity equivalent reserves to capital, and periodic changes in the reserves to 
after-tax operating profits (Stewart, 1991).^  It differs from the traditional measure of 
residual income that represents the difference between NOP AT and the cost of 
capital, but not adjustment for distortions caused by accounting reporting. An EVA 
measure is therefore equivalent to economic profits that explicitly take into account 
the total cost of capital, namely the sum of equity and debt, and require accounting 
adjustments. 
While a consistent philosophy of EVA has been applied, most companies 
measure EVA in different ways. As in Weaver (2001), none of the 29 Stem Stewart 
& Co. clients respondents to the survey measure EVA the same way. Table 3.1 
shows some common adjustments in calculating EVA that were shown in that 
survey. Due to differences in institutional arrangements such as the accounting rules 
and regulations, the adjustments for firms in China and Hong Kong will also be 
‘We adopted the same definition of total capital as in Uyemura (1997). 
2 Equity equivalent reserves include deferred income tax reserves, LIFO reserves, net capitalized 
R&D, and amortization of goodwill, etc. 
13 
different than those firms in the U.S. For instance, Hu and Lu (2000) have adjusted 
the measure in a different way and their adjustments are shown in Table 3.2. 
Insert Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 Here 
As this study is concerned about firms in China and Hong Kong, the 
computation of the relevant measures will be similar to that of Hu and Lu (2000). 
Due to the availability of the data, however, there are also differences as several 
items are not available in PACAP and TEJ databases. These items include 
"Goodwill"(累計商譽攤銷）,"Bad Debts + Provision"(各種準備金一壞賬準 
備、存貨跌價準備等）and "Long-Term Loans Due in Short Term"(長期借款中 
短期內到期的部分）• Also, the item "Research and Development Investment"(硏 
究發展費用白勺資本化金額)does not seem to have a suitable match. As these items 
are not very significance according to the results from Weaver (2001), the results in 
this study should not be affected materially when these items are discarded. The 
components in constructing the EVA and the adjustments used in this study are 
shown in Table 3.3 and are discussed as follows. 
Insert Table 3.3 Here 
3.2.1 Net Operating Profit After Taxes (NOPAT) 
The terms use in calculating Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) are as follows: 
1. Net Income: This is the difference between a business' total revenue and its 
total expenses. This caption and amount is usually found at the bottom of a 
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company's income statement. It is the starting point for our calculation of 
NOPAT.3 
2. Interest Expense: This is the interest paid for debts during the current period. 
3. Minority Interest: It is the interest or percentage ownership of a group of 
stockholders who, in total, own less than 50% of the shares in the 
corporation. Hu and Lu (2000) had added this term in calculating NOP AT, 
so we will also add this term. In the TEJ database, this refers to the equity 
interest in subsidiaries of the parent company. It also only appears in 
consolidated reports, and its value is zero in unconsolidated reports."^ 
4. Deferred Taxes: This is the liability that results from income that has already 
been earned for accounting purposes but not for tax purposes. It arises from 
timing differences between taxable income and the book income recognized. 
The deferred tax expense because it is not a cash cost. So we eliminate the 
impact of deferred taxes by adding the change in the net deferred tax liability 
for the year.5 
5. Amortization: (a) This is the gradual reduction of a debt by means of equal 
periodic payments sufficient to meet current interest and liquidate the debt at 
maturity. When the debt involves real property, often the periodic payments 
include a sum sufficient to pay taxes and hazard insurance on the property; (b) 
This is also the process of spreading the cost of an intangible asset over the 
expected useful life of the asset. For example: a company pays $100,000 for 
3 For firms listed in China, this is equal to Pre-Tax Income (3900) - Income Tax Expense (3910 ) -
Appropriated Funds (3919) in the TEJ database. 
4 Some companies combine the Minority Interest with Other Liabilities. When they do so, we cannot 
separate them, so we put the Other Liabilities in Minority Interest. 
5 For firms listed in China, this is equal to the sum of Item 1211 to Item 1219 in the TEJ database, i.e., 
Product Taxes Payable, Value Added Taxes Payable, Business Taxes Payable, Income Taxes Payable, 
Property Taxes Payable, Two Funds Payable, Enterprise Adjusted Taxes Payable, Individual Salary 
Adjusted Taxes, Other Taxes Payable. It also includes Two Funds Payable and Payable on Income. 
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a patent, they amortize the cost over the 16 years useful life of the patent. As 
it is not required for the listed firms in Hong Kong to disclose their 
amortization expenses, we cannot include this adjustment for the Hong Kong 
data. 
6. Allowance: A sum set aside for an occurrence that may or may not come to 
pass. For example, funds earmarked for expenses associated with potential 
bad weather. It is also not required for the listed firms in Hong Kong to 
disclose their allowance expenses, so we cannot include this adjustment for 
the Hong Kong data. 
3.2.2 Invested Capital (INCAP) 
The explanation of minority interest and tax payable were shown in the calculation 
of NOPAT part. Also, as the listed firms in China and Hong Kong are not required 
to disclose their "Research and Development Investment," we cannot include this 
adjustment in our study. The other terms use in calculating Invested Capital (INCAP) 
are as follows: 
1. Common Stock: Securities representing equity ownership in a corporation, 
providing voting rights, and entitling the holder to a share of the company's 
success through dividends and/or capital appreciation. In the event of 
liquidation, common stock holders have rights to a company's assets only 
after bondholders, other debt holders, and preferred stock holders have been 
satisfied. Also called junior equity. 
2. Short-Term Loans: Loans that should be repaid within one year. These 
include the short-term borrowing from financial institutions, affiliated 
companies, associates, stockholders, or employees. 
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3. Long-Term Loans: Loans and obligations with maturity of longer than one 
year; usually accompanied by interest payments. These include loans from 
banks, bonds & convertible bonds (debentures), installments payable, other 
long-term loans, and other long-term payables. Also called funded debt. 
3.2.3 Cost of Capital 
Litzenberger and Rao (1972) had stated that CAPM provided insights into the 
relationship between industry cost of capital and risk. So we used the conventional 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to calculate a proxy for the opportunity cost of 
capital for each firm in a particular industry. The CAPM has the form: 
E(r) = r , + A E ( r J - r》， 
where E(r) = expected rate of return of the industry, 
rf = risk-free rate of return, 
rm = market rate of return, 
J3 = estimated beta for the industry. 
The CAPM is usually used to estimate the expected return of individual stocks, and 
thus the cost of equity of a single firm. In order to reduce the sampling errors 
resulting from a growing equity market such as China, we shall estimate the cost of 
capital for each firm on the industry basis. Since we are grouping the firms into the 
industries and use the same cost of capital for firms in the same industry, the effect 
of debt would average out. So it would be reasonable to use the return calculated by 
CAPM as a proxy of cost of capital of the industry. 
The beta for each industry is estimated by regressing the value-weighted 
market returns on the value-weighted industry return. The value-weighted industry 
return is calculated by: 
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^Z^KQX^CO 
where: MVco = market value of the company in one particular industry, 
rco = return of a company in one particular industry. 
3.2 Hypothesis of Interest 
While an examination of the EVA is important on its own, it is also of interest to 
examine if these performance measures carry more information content than that of 
traditional measures in emerging markets such as Hong Kong and China. 
Specifically, this study will examine the hypothesis that EVA is a better measure of 
firm performance than other measures such as earnings through the following 
regression model: 
MV = a + fi.EBEI + fi^CFO + + 
where MV is the market value of the company, EBEI is the earning before 
extraordinary items of the company, CFO is the cash flow from operating of the 
company, EVA is the economic value added of the company. Note that ^ds the 
regression constant, fii and pi are the coefficients on the EBEI, CFO and EVA, 
respectively. The reason of choosing EBEI and CFO to be included in the regression 
model is that they are the most common traditional accounting performance 
measures. 
While there is no a priori restriction on the regression constant term a, we 
believe it would be positive in most cases. Theoretically, the firm may still retain 
some value even when it has zero EBEI, CFO and EVA, as there may still be 
possibility that it will gain positive profits in the future. 
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It has been argued that the EBEI has information content on firm value. In 
particular, on would expect positive EBEI should increase the value of the company, 
and negative EBEI should decrease the value of the company. Thus, if the EBEI 
carries information about the firm, we would expect fi to be significant and positive. 
As cash flow is fundamental in the value of a firm, one would expect that the 
CFO should contain information content on the firm. In particular, positive CFO 
should increase the value of the company, and negative CFO should decrease the 
value of the company. So, if the CFO does contain information on the firm value, 
the coefficient pi is expected to be significant and positive. 
The variable that is of most interest in this study is EVA. Theoretically, positive 
EVA should increase the value of the company, and negative EVA should decrease 
the value of the company. If the EVA does contain information reflecting the value 
of the firm, and thus the shareholders' value, we would expect that to be 
significant and positive. 
In summary, this set of tests indicates whether these predictors of firm value 
provide value-relevant information. Rejection of the hypothesis is viewed as 
evidence of no or insignificant information content in the predictors. 
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Table 3.1: Common adjustments in calculating Net Operating Profit After Tax 
(NOPAT) and Invested Capital (INCAP) by Weaver (2001). 
Net Operating Profit After Tax Invested Capital Adjustments 
A. US GAAP Adjustments A. US GAAP Adjustments 
NOP AT Excludes: INCAP Excludes: 
1. Discontinued Operations # 1. Accounts Payable * 
2. Extraordinary Items # 2. Accrued Liabilities * 
3. Changes in Accounting 3. Other Payables # 
4. Restructuring Charges * 4. Other Non-Debt Current liabilities # 
5. Other One - Time Charges # 5. Notes Payable 
6. Interest Expense * 6. Short-Term Debt 
7. Interest Income * 7. Long-Term Debt 
8. Deferred Taxes 
9. Pension Liabilities (or Assets) 
10. Other Long-Term Liabilities 
B. Non-US GAAP Adjustments B. Non-US GAAP Adjustments 
Coordination with US GAAP NOP AT 
Alignment with Cash Flow: Adjustments: 
8. Expense Cash Taxes Only 11. Discontinued Operations 
9. Eliminate Amortization of Goodwill * 12. Extraordinary Items # 
10. Eliminate Amortization of Intangibles * 13. Changes in Accounting 
11. Change COGS to FIFO Basis 14. Restructuring Charges # 
15. Other One-Time Charges 
Non-Alignment with Cash Flow: 
Capitalization of: Permanent Capitalization of: 
12. Research and Development Investment 16. Goodwill # 
13. Advertising "investment" 17. Intangibles 
14. Operating Leases 18. Goodwill of Divested Businesses 
19. Inclusion of FIFO Based Inventory 
Capitalization and Subsequent Amortization: 
20. Research and Development Investment 
21 • Advertising investment 
22. Operating Leases * 
Note: Items with * are those adjustments that more than 50% of the respondents 
made and with a significance point of more than 3 out of 5. Items with # are those 
adjustments that more than 50% of the respondents made and with a significance 
point of more than 2.5 but less than 3. 
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Table 3.2: The adjustments in calculating Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) 
and Invested Capital (INCAP) by Hu and Lu (2000). 
Net Operating Profit After Tax 稅後淨營業利潤 
Net Income 稅後淨利潤 
+ Interest Expense + 禾丨J息費用 
+ Minority Interest +少數股東損益 
+ Amortization +本年商譽攤銷 
+ Deferred Tax (this year - last year) +遞延稅項貸方餘額的增力口 
+ (Bad Debt + Provision) +其他準備金餘額的增加 
(this year — last year) 
+ Research and Development Investment + 資本化硏究發展費用 
-Amortization in R&D -資本化硏究發展費用在本年的攤銷 
Invested Capital 資本總額 
Common Stock 普通股權益 
+ Minority Interest +少數股東權益 
+ Deferred Taxation +遞延稅項貸方餘額 
+ Goodwill +累計商譽攤銷 
+ (Bad Debts + Provision) + 各種準備金 
(壞賬準備、存貨跌價準備等） 
+ Research and Development Investment +硏究發展費用的資本化金額 
+ Short-Term Loans + 短期借款 
+ Long-Term Loans + 長期借款 
+ Long-Term Loans due in Short Term +長期借款中短期內到期的部分 
21 
Table 3.3: The adjustments in calculating Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) 
and Invested Capital (INCAP) in this study. 
稅後淨營業利潤 ™ PACAP 
稅後淨利潤 Net Income (3950) Net Income (INC9 for 
industrial companies; 
INCB8 for financial 
companies) 
+ 利息費用 Interest Paid (7710) Interest Expense (HKF37) 
+ 少數股東損益 Minority Interest (2900) Minority Interest (HKF26) 
+ 遞延稅項貸方餘額的增 Change in Tax Payable Changes in Deferred 
加 (1210) Taxation (HKF17 for 
Industrial Companies; 
HKFB21 for Financial 
Companies) 
+ 本年商譽攤銷 Amortization (7212) — 
+其他準備金餘額的增加Changes in Allowance — 
(1666) 
資本總額 ™ PACAP 
普通股權益 Common Stock (2110) Ending Price-Common 
Stock (MKT3) X Number 
of Shares Outstanding 
(MKT5) 
+ 少數股東權益 Minority Interest (2900) Minority Interest (HKF26) 
+ 遞延稅項貸方餘額 Tax Payable (1210) Deferred Taxation (HKF 17 
for Industrial Companies) 
+ 短期借款 Short-Term Borrowing Short-Term Loans (BALll 
(1120) for Industrial Companies) 
+ 長期借款 Long- term Liabilities Long-Term Loans (BALI4 
(1400) for Industrial Companies) 
+長期借款中短期內到期Current Portion of L o n g - — 
的部分 Term Debt (1220) 
+各種準備金(壞賬準 Allowance (1666) — 
備、存貨跌價準備等） 
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Chapter 4 Empirical Results 
4.1 The Cost of Capital 
As discussed before, an important determinant of the Economic Value Added (EVA) 
is the cost of capital. Following the conventional practice, we use the CAPM to 
estimate the cost of capital of each firm on an industry basis. Specifically, we 
aggregate individual firms listed in China into 16 industries according to the 
classification provided by the Hong Kong Macau Information Industrial Co., Ltd.! 
As for firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, we group them into 7 
industries suing the classification scheme in the PACAP. Furthermore, we choose 
the Shenzhen A-Share Index for China and the value-weighted market index for 
Hong Kong as the respective market indexes.^ 
Monthly observations from the TEJ and the PACAP databases are used to 
estimate the relevant betas for firms in China and Hong Kong. As the Shenzhen A-
Share Index was available in TEJ database only after the October 1992, so the 
sample period used for China is from October 1992 to December 2000, i.e., around 
90 to 98 observations for each industry. As for Hong Kong, the data in PACAP are 
only available up to 1999, so we used data from January 1990 to December 1999， 
i.e., around 119 observations for each industry. 
After estimating the beta for each industry, we can now compute the 
industry-wide cost of capital. Note that, however, the stock markets in both Hong 
‘The classification scheme is provided in http://www.cnlist.com. 
2 For Hong Kong, the value-weighted market returns with cash dividend reinvested are provided in 
the PACAP. For China, however, there is really no representative market index that is generally 
accepted. The results in this study remain qualitatively similar when an alternative such as the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (上証綜合指數） in Hu and Lu (2000) is used. 
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Kong and China appear to be quite volatile, and both markets have experience some 
very bad times in which even the annual market returns (and so as the market risk 
premiums) were negative in value. As it would be unreasonable for investors to 
expect negative returns for their investments, these observations should be a result of 
large (negative) shocks on the expected returns. Since we need the expected return 
as a proxy for the opportunity cost of capital over the sample period, we shall use the 
average annual market risk premium in between 1993 and 2000 for China, and 
between 1990 and 1999 for Hong Kong as the market risk premium for every year in 
the sample. The estimates of the market risk premium, as well as the beta and the 
cost of capital for each industry are shown in Table 4.1. 
Insert Table 4.1 Here 
Observe that for China, industry 1 (電子通訊）and industry 7 (金融地 
產 ) h a v e large beta and cost of capital, with the former being the highest and the 
latter being the second highest. On the other hand, industry 11 (輕工製造 ) and 
industry 8 (肯b源電力)have small beta and cost of capital. This may due to the fact 
that China was developing fast since 1990, electronic communication, finance and 
properties would be consider as relatively new industries and so bear higher risk and 
required rate of return. As for Hong Kong, industry 3 (Properties) has the largest 
beta and cost of capital. This may due to the uncertainty in the housing and real 
estate price over the recent years. Conversely, industry 2 (Utilities) has the smallest 
beta and cost of capital. It seems that these industries are less sensitive to market 
fluctuation. 
24 
4.2 Economic Value Added (EVA) in China and Hong Kong 
After the cost of capital has been computed, we can now construct the EVA. The 
steps in calculating INCAP, NOP AT and EVA have been discussed in the 
methodology chapter. As the TEJ database for China also include "current portion of 
debt" and “ allowance" which could be use in the calculation of the INCAP, and 
"amortization" which could be use in the calculation of NOP AT, so we have 
calculated two sets of results for China. The first set used all available data to 
calculate the INCAP, NOP AT and EVA. The other set used only the similar data set 
as those used for calculating the Hong Kong results. 
4.2.1 Analysis of the EVA: Overall 
4.2.1.1 China 
We first compute the INCAP, NOP AT, and EVA of all listed firms in China 
between 1993 and 2000 on an annual basis. The annual average of these quantities 
are reported in Table 4.2 and shown in Figure 4.1. 
Insert Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 Here 
We can observe that the average INCAP was increasing since 1993. The 
percentage increase in 1994-1995 was the smallest (2% when all available data are 
used, and 3.5% when data similar to that used for Hong Kong are used), and the 
increase in 1999-2000 was the largest (44% when all available data are used, and 
46.8% when data similar to that used for Hong Kong are used). 
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The average NOP AT experienced decrease in 1994—1996 (-9.9% and -4.9% 
when all available data are used; -7.6% and -2% when data similar to that used for 
Hong Kong are used), in which the percentage decrease in 1994-1995 was the 
largest. After than, the average NOP AT increase steadily since 1996. 
The average EVA was negative throughout the whole sample years, but it 
was decreasing with diminishing amplitudes until 1997. The average EVA 
experienced increase in 1997-1999 (12.4% and 9.7% when all available data are 
used; 10.5% and 15% when data similar to that used for Hong Kong are used), in 
which the percentage increase in 1997-1998 was the largest. After 1998, the average 
EVA decreased again. The percentage decrease in average EVA was highest in 
1999-2000 (-53.7% when all available data are used, and -71.9% when data similar 
to that used for Hong Kong are used). 
The standard deviations of INCAP, NOP AT and EVA among the sample 
firms were all largest at 2000, but they experience their lowest value at different 
years: 1994 for EVA, 1995 for INCAP and 1996 for NOP AT. 
4.2.1.2 Hong Kong 
We then compute the INCAP, NOP AT，and EVA of all listed firms in Hong Kong 
between 1990 and 1999 on an annual basis. The annual average of these quantities 
are reported in Table 4.3 and shown in Figure 4.2. 
Insert Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2 Here 
Observe that the average INCAP for Hong Kong firms was increasing over 
the years except for 1993-1994 and 1997-1998 (-18.9% and -25.4% respectively), 
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in which the percentage decrease in 1997-1998 is the largest. The percentage 
increase is largest in 1992-1993 (46.6%). 
The average NOPAT was also increasing over the years, except for 1994-
1995 and 1997-1998 (-2% and -26.8% respectively), in which the percentage 
decrease in 1997-1998 was the largest. The percentage increase in average NOPAT 
were large in 1992-1993 and 1998-1999 (37.2% and 72.7% respectively), with the 
increase in 1998-1999 being the largest in the sample. 
The average EVA was also negative throughout the whole sample years, but 
the fluctuation of the EVA for firms in Hong Kong was more volatile than that of 
firms in China. Specifically, the EVA was increasing in 1991-1992, 1993—1994, and 
1997-1999 (3.3%, 23.3%, 25% and 22.4% respectively), in which the percentage 
increase was largest in 1997-1998. The average EVA was decreasing throughout 
1995-1997, but the percentage decrease was largest in 1992-1993 (-53.6%). 
The standard deviations of INCAP, NOPAT and EVA were all smallest at 
1990. Both INCAP and EVA experienced their largest standard deviation at 1997, 
but NOPAT experienced its largest standard deviation at 1999. 
4.2.1.3 Comparison between China and Hong Kong 
For ease of comparison, Figure 4.3 shows the average annual EVA for firms in 
China and Hong Kong. From Figure 4.3, we can see that both China and Hong Kong 
were experiencing drop in average EVA form 1994 to 1997，reached their minimum 
at 1997 and increased steadily from 1997 to 1999. 
Insert Figure 4.3 Here 
The minimum EVA in 1997 may be the result of Asian financial crisis, as 
both China and Hong Kong markets were affected by the Asian financial crisis. 
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Although both markets experienced negative average EVA throughout the period, 
the average EVA in Hong Kong was far more negative and volatile. Also, the 
directions of movement of EVA in the two markets were quite similar. That may due 
to the close relationship between China and Hong Kong. 
4.2.2 Analysis of the EVA: Industry 
4.2.2.1 China 
It is also important to examine the cross section behavior of the NOP AT, INCAP, 
and EVA across industries. The average annual INCAP, NOP AT and EVA for firms 
listed in China by industry are presented in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.4. 
Insert Table 4.4 and Figure 4.4 Here 
We can see that industries 3 (公用事業），13 (冶金）and 8 (能源電力） 
are the three industries that are having the highest average INCAP through out the 
sample period. This seemed to be reasonable as these three industries would require 
a lot of investment on fixed assets and equipments. On the other hand, industries 12 
(商貿旅游），14 (醫藥）and 16 (綜合）are the three industries that are having 
the lowest average INCAP. 
The three industries having the highest average NOP AT throughout the 
sample period are industries 8 (能源電力），3 (公用事業）and 6 (交通運輸）. 
Again, this seemed reasonable as these three industries provide daily necessities that 
do not face strong competition through imports. The three industries having the 
lowest average NOP AT throughout the sample period are industries 16 (,綜合），12 
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(商貿旅游）and 10 (農林牧漁），where the order is 16，12，10 when all 
available data are used, and the order is 12，10，16 when data similar to that used for 
Hong Kong are used. 
For the three industries having the least negative average EVA, there is a 
little different in the two data sets. When using all available data, they are industries 
9 (釀酒食品），14 (醫藥）and 12 (商貿旅游）.They are industry 9 (釀酒食 
品），8 (能源電力）and 12 (商貿旅游）data similar to that used for Hong Kong 
are used. On the other hand, industries 13 (冶金），3 (公用事業）and 4 (化工） 
are the three industries having the most negative average EVA throughout the 
sample period. 
It is interesting to note that industry 3 (公用事業 )was in the highest three 
in average INCAP and NOPAT but was in the lowest three in average EVA, while 
industry 12 (商貿旅游）was in the lowest three in average INCAP and NOPAT 
but was in the highest three in average EVA. 
In terms of standard deviation, industries 6 (交通運輸 ) , 1 3 (冶金 ) a n d 4 
(化工 ) w e r e the three industries with the highest standard deviation in both 
INCAP and EVA over the years. The three industries with the highest standard 
deviation in NOPAT were industries 8 (能源電力），3 (公用事業）and 4 (化 
工）. 
The three industries with the lowest standard deviation in INCAP were 
industries 10 (農林牧漁），5 (重工製造）and 12 (商貿旅游）.Industries 12 
(商貿旅游），14 (醫藥）and 5 (建材建築）were the three industries with the 
lowest standard deviation in both NOPAT and EVA. 
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We can see that industry 4 (化工 )was in one of the three highest standard 
deviation in all three variables (INCAP, NOP AT and EVA). Both industries 5 (重 
工製造 ) and 12 (商貿旅、游)were in one of the three lowest standard deviation in 
all three variables (INCAP, NOP AT and EVA). 
4.2.2.2 Hong Kong 
The average annual INCAP, NOP AT and EVA for firms listed in Hong Kong by 
industry are presented in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5. 
Insert Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5 Here 
It is interesting to see that industry 2 (Utilities) had the highest average 
INCAP and NOPAT, but also had the lowest (or most negative) EVA. The industry 
with second highest INCAP and NOPAT is industry 3 (Properties), and the industry 
with the highest (or least negative) EVA is industry 5 (Industrials). It seems 
reasonable for utilities and properties industries having the highest average INCAP 
as both industries need a lot of investment in fixed assets. 
On the contrary, industry 7 (Others) had the lowest average INCAP and 
NOPAT, and the second highest (or second least negative) EVA. The industry with 
second lowest INCAP and NOPAT is industry 5 (Industrials), and the industry with 
the second lowest (or second most negative) EVA is industry 3 (Properties). 
We can also see that industry 2 (Utilities) had the highest standard deviation 
in both INCAP and EVA, and the second highest standard deviation in NOPAT. 
Industry 3 (Properties) had the highest standard deviation in NOPAT, and the second 
highest standard deviation in EVA. On the other hand, industry 7 (Others) had the 
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lowest standard deviation in all INCAP, NOP AT and EVA. Industry 5 (industrials) 
had the second lowest standard deviation in all INCAP, NOP AT and EVA. 
4.2.2.3 Comparison between China and Hong Kong 
As summarized in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5，it is somewhat to our surprise that the 
average EVA for both China and Hong Kong data are negative in value for almost 
every industry. An interesting thing to see is that the Utilities Industry (industry 3 
for China and industry 2 for Hong Kong) in both markets was in the highest one in 
average INCAP and NOP AT, but was in the lowest ones in average EVA. 
4.2.3 Discussions 
From the above results, one would lead to ask why were the average EVA negative 
for firms in Hong Kong and China? The EVA will be negative when the net 
operating profit after tax is less than the product of invested capital and the cost of 
capital. It is not entirely unreasonable for a firm to have a negative EVA for a period 
of time. Pettit (2001) has stated that a company may make a decision or undertakes 
an investment with negative EVA for strategic move. These strategic holdings or 
investments are ones currently earning less than their cost of capital (negative EVA) 
that will earn sufficiently more than their cost of capital (positive EVA) in the future. 
However, it seems unlikely that the average EVA of all firms in all industry 
in every year of eight to ten years sample were all negative, or that the industry 
average EVA in eight to ten years sample were all negative, only for that simple 
reason. The average EVA of both Hong Kong and China firms were negative 
through out the sample years. Also, both markets experienced their local minimum 
average EVA in the year 1997 — the year that the unexpected financial crisis hit the 
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high-performing East and Southeast Asian economies. Some possible explanations 
are provided as follows. 
4.2.3.1 China 
China had undergone a lot of economic reforms in 1990s. For instance, China 
unified its exchange rate by bringing the official rate into line with the prevailing 
swap-market rate in 1994, further relaxed its open-door policy towards foreign direct 
investment, including the provision of special tax incentives to foreign investment in 
technology-intensive industries, provided generous tariff concessions (including 
lower income tax rates and tax holidays) to firms operating in the coastal special 
economic zones. All of these policies only served to further enhance China's 
international competitiveness and help it greatly expand its export markets. 
But like other transition economies, markets for corporate securities in China are 
limited and most lending unsecuritized. 
Despite the introduction of The Central Bank Law in March 1995, which 
gave sweeping powers to the People's Bank of China (PBGC) to implement 
monetary policy and to exercise financial supervision over the other financial 
institutions, the PBOC, which still operated under the watchful eye of the State 
Council, hardly constituted an independent entity. The PBOC’ s supplicant 
managerial class, its weak supervisory and disclosure framework, as well as the 
pervasive meddling by recalcitrant powerful political bosses, prevented the PBOC 
from exercising real discretion. 
Lardy (1998) stated that, "China's largest banks are not subject to even 
report their consolidated financial results, meaning that losses can be buried in 
subsidiary firms. Non-performing loans are classified by more lenient standards than 
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the international norm, impairing the value of the data in measuring bank 
performance." Weak central bank supervision combined with ineffective prudential 
regulation have made it easier for obstinate Communist party insiders, influential 
provincial bosses, and those with the ubiquitous "guanxi" (interpersonal relationship) 
connections to influence access to credit to their own advantage, besides channeling 
funds to themselves and their cronies through fraud, corruption, and other lending 
irregularities. 
The concessionary indirect "soft credits" or "policy loans" from state banks 
to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), were implicitly guaranteed by the government, as 
well as granted under preferential terms, were cheap credit to the SOEs. Therefore, it 
is quite possible that these cheap and unsecuritized loans may have been at least part 
of the negative EVA that most China firms had experienced. As the SOEs and other 
company owners or managers with "guanxi" connections could access the bank 
loans at low cost and easily, they would borrow recklessly and invest in projects or 
subsidiaries that earn accounting profit, but suffer economic loss. That is value 
destructing, and result in negative EVA. 
Therefore, we can see industry 3 (公用事業)while in the highest three in 
both average INCAP and NOP AT, it was in the lowest three in average EVA. Also, 
we can see that the average EVA in China were experiencing drop from 1994 to 
1997，then began to increase steadily from 1997 to 1999. That may due to the burst 
of economic bubble in 1997 and Asian Financial Crisis had cried for financial and 
institutional reform, and anti-corruption campaign. But we can also see that the 
average EVA dropped again from 1999-2000. That may due to the fact that 
financial criminal activities, cronyism, and favoritism still rampant, and financial 
and institutional reform need time to finish. 
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4.2.3.2 Hong Kong 
In 1990s, Hong Kong investment began to flows into new industrial zones in China 
that produce goods for export. Hong Kong was the busiest container port in the 
world and one of the world's largest exporters, although most exports are now 
classified as re-exports. It also remains one of the financial capitals of the world. 
Since 1997, Hong Kong keeps its status as a free port and tariff-free zone 
under the "one country, two systems" agreement with China. But the Asian financial 
crisis was a blow to Hong Kong, as its primary trading partners besides China and 
the U.S. are Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. Reduced import demand 
creates a downturn in Hong Kong's exports and re-exports. 
Hong Kong has a more developed financial system than China. Its main form 
of corporate governance is also different from China. While the main enterprises in 
China are state-owned, most companies in Hong Kong are family-controlled. 
According to Wang, Au and Peng (2000), it is fair to say with few exceptions, that in 
Hong Kong and a large part of Asia where ethnic Chinese business dominates, 
businesses regardless of whether they are big or small are all managed to some 
degree as family businesses. Also, it is difficult for these Chinese family enterprises 
to accept and embrace the concept that "their" corporations, listed or otherwise, are 
separate entities and need to be governed and managed as such. In family enterprises, 
founding member would often want to extend their success as quickly as possible to 
their immediate family members, and appoint them as board members. So the most 
capable persons may not be appointed to serve on these boards. And in some cases, 
that if all boards are flooded with such board members, they may put their individual 
ownership interests before the corporate interests. 
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Lang and Young (2001a, 2001b, 2001c) stated that given weak institutions, 
debt might serve to facilitate, rather than to constrain, managerial expropriated via 
unfair transactions with related parties. A majority (54.2%) of corporations can 
access related party lending in Asia. East Asia's business networks are based on 
family and long-term associates that permitted complex transactions without a law 
of contract. Problems arose only when growth proceeded to the point where 
companies had to seek outside sources of finance to continue their growth. Without 
institutions to ensure shareholder protection, managers could not be disciplined by 
the takeover market as in the U.S. 
The East Asian alternative was the formation of extensive corporate 
pyramids. These permitted successful business families to reach out for external 
capital, while retaining control of management. Similarly, weak creditor protection 
prevented arms-length loans. Banks were therefore integrated into the corporate 
pyramids: related parties could at least be relied upon to repay their loans. These 
creative ways of tapping wider pools of capital, despite weak capital market 
institutions, open the door to the expropriation by the controlling shareholder/ 
manager. Loans were provided by banks low in pyramids, with top managers from 
the controlling family, despite its low equity stake. Since the family had small equity 
stake and limited liability in the bank, their collapse would left intact the family's 
prior gains from expropriation. 
Therefore, it is quite likely that the abilities to expropriate outsiders (include 
minority share-holders, creditors and others) may have been at least part of the 
reason for the negative EVA that most Hong Kong firms had experienced. As the 
companies are listed, they must have reached the point where outside sources of 
finance are needed. With the motive to protect their family interests and ability to 
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expropriate the outsiders, they may get capital from shareholder and creditors that 
are outsiders to their family, and invest in projects or subsidiaries that earn 
accounting profit, but suffer economic loss. That is value destructing, and result in 
negative EVA. 
Also, we can see that the average EVA in Hong Kong were experiencing 
drop from 1995 to 1997, then began to increase steadily from 1997 to 1999. In our 
opinion, the Asian Financial Crisis may have raised the awareness of investors and 
banks to the expropriation game, and made it more difficult for the family-controlled 
companies to play the expropriation game. 
4.3 Testing of the Hypothesis 
Even though the EVA has been found to be negative, we can still investigate the 
information content of such a measure in China and Hong Kong. Before testing the 
hypothesis postulated previously, we shall first examine the behavior of the other 
two measures — earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI) and the cash flow from 
operating (CFO) 一 for firms in China and Hong Kong. Note that the EBEI was 
calculated by "net income 一 extraordinary items", and the CFO was calculated by 
"net income + depreciation + decrease in inventories + increase in account payable + 
decrease in account receivable + increase in tax payable." 
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4.3.1 EBEI and CFO in China and Hong Kong 
4.3.1.1 Analysis of EBEI and CFO: Overall 
4.3.1.1.1 China 
We first compute the EBEI and the CFO for all listed firms in China between 1993 
and 2000 on an annual basis. The annual average of these quantities are reported in 
Table 4.6 and shown in Figure 4.6. 
Insert Table 4.6 and Figure 4.6 Here 
It is observed that the average EBEI was decreasing since 1993 to 1996. The 
percentage decrease was largest in 1995-1996 (-25.5%). It increased in a relatively 
small percentage in 1996—1997 (5.2%), and decreased again in 1997—1998. It 
increased steadily after 1998, and the percentage increase was largest in 1998—1999 
(17.9%). 
The average CFO was more volatile than the average EBEI. The EBEI 
increased from 1993-1994 (38.4%). After that, it was decreasing from 1994-1997, 
and the percentage decrease was largest in 1995-1996 (-133.7%). It then increased 
in large magnitude in 1997 to 1999 (410% and 328%). It decreased again in 1999-
2000, but the percentage decrease was relatively small (2.3%). We can see that both 
average EBEI and CFO were at their lowest points in 1996 and 1997. 
The standard deviation of EBEI was increasing steadily through out the 
sample years. It was smallest at 1993 and largest at 2000. The standard deviation of 
CFO also had a trend of increasing through out the sample year, but it had decreased 
in 1994-1995 (-12.11%) and 1997-1998 (-1%). 
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4,3.1.1.2 Hong Kong 
We then compute the EBEI and the CFO for all listed firms in Hong Kong between 
1990 and 1999 on an annual basis. The annual average of these quantities are 
reported in Table 4.7 and shown in Figure 4.7. 
Insert Table 4.7 and Figure 4.7 Here 
It 
We observe that the average EBEI increased in an increasing percentage rate 
:i. • 
'1 
from 1990 to 1993，then the percentage increase became smaller in 1993-1994. It s) 
decreased (-10.7%) inl994-1995, and started to increase again. The EBEI increased 
(22.3%) to its maximum value throughout the sample years in 1997 and then it 
decrease dramatically (-73.1%) to its minimum value throughout the sample years 
t.， 
in 1998. After that, the average EBEI had its largest percentage increase (79.3%) <• 
1 
throughout the sample in 1998—1999. ：丨 
The average CFO increased (22.9%) in 1990—1991，then decreased (—16.2%) ‘ 
in 1991-1992. Then it increased in an increasing percentage from 1992 to 1994. It 
decreased again in 1994-1995 (—19.9%), and had a small increase in 1995-1996 
(0.38%). After that, it had a small decrease (-3%) again. It had its largest percentage 
increase (56.5%) in 1997-1998. Then, it decreased (-10.6%) again in 1998-1999. 
We can see that the trends of EBEI and CFO were quite similar, expect for 
1997-1998. In that year, EBEI experienced its largest percentage decrease, but CFO 
experienced its largest percentage decrease. Both EBEI and CFO experienced their 
largest percentage increase in 1996-1997. 
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The standard deviation of EBEI increased from 1990 to 1997. The 
percentage increase was largest (26.7%) in 1996-1997. Then, it decreased in 
decrease percentage rate from 1997 to 1999 (-22.9% and -4%). 
The standard deviation of CFO increased (41.5%) in 1990—1991. Then, it 
experienced its largest percentage decrease (-42.5%) in 1991-1992. It increased in 
decreasing percentage rate from 1992-1995 (69.4%, 13.6%, and 9.7%). It decreased 
(-9%) again in 1995-1996. Then, it experienced its largest percentage increase 
(86.7%) in 1996-1997. After that, it decreased in decrease percentage rate from 
1997 to 1999 (-30.3% and -2.1%). 
4.3.1.2 Analysis of EBEI and CFO: Industry 
4.3.1.2.1 China 
Again, it is important to have an idea on the cross section behavior of the EBEI and 
CFO across industries. The average annual EBEI and CFO for firms listed in China 
by industry are presented in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.8. 
Insert Table 4.8 and Figure 4.8 Here 
The three industries with the highest average EBEI throughout the sample 
were industries 8 (能源電力），13 (冶金）and 3 (公用事業）.On the other side， 
industries 16 (綜合），10 (農林牧漁）and 12 (商貿旅游）were the three 
industries with the lowest average EBEI. 
The three industries with the highest average CFO were industry 8 (倉巨、源電 
力），6 (交通運輸）and 3 (公用事業）.On the other side，industry 7 (金融地 
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產），16 (綜合 ) a n d 5 (建材建築）were the three industries with the lowest 
average CFO. 
In terms of standard deviation, industries 8 (肯b源電力) ,4 ( ftX ) and 3 
(公用事業 )were the three industries with the highest standard deviation in EBEI. 
Industries 14 (醫藥），5 (建材建築）and 12 (商貿旅游）were the three 
industries with the lowest standard deviation in EBEI. 
Industries 8 (能源電力），6 (交通運輸 )and 13 (冶金）were the three 丨' 
..I 
i 




14 (醫藥）and 12 (商貿方使游）were the three industries with the lowest standard 
deviation in CFO. 
We can see that industry 8 (肯巨、源電力)had the highest average in both 
EBEI and CFO. It also had the highest standard deviation in both EBEI and CFO. In ‘ 
addition, industry 3 (公用事業 ) w a s in one of the three highest averages in both ； 
EBEI and CFO. The only industry with negative CFO was industry 7 (金融地產）， 
but its EBEI was not low. That may due to the fact that the finance and properties 
industry is relatively new to the China market. Most of the earnings maybe in form 
of account receivable. 
4.3.1.2,2 Hong Kong 
The average annual EBEI and CFO for firms listed in Hong Kong by industry are 
presented in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.9. 
Insert Table 4.9 and Figure 4.9 Here 
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Observe that industry 2 (Utilities) had the highest average in both EBEI and 
CFO. It also had the highest standard deviation in both EBEI and CFO. Industry 3 
(Properties) had the second highest average in both EBEI and CFO. It also had the 
second highest standard deviation in both EBEI and CFO. 
On the other hand, industry 7 (Others) had the lowest average in both EBEI 
and CFO. It also had the lowest standard deviation in both EBEI and CFO. Industry 
5 had the second lowest average EBEI. Industry 1 (Finance) had the second lowest 
average CFO. It also had the second lowest standard deviation in both EBEI and 
CFO. 
On the whole, we can see that the utilities industry in both China and Hong 
Kong markets have high average EBEI and CFO as compared to other industries. 
4.3.2 Regression on Market Value 
Recall that the hypothesis of interest concerns the information contents of these 
measures. That is, we are trying to test whether one of these predictors (EBEI, CFO, 
EVA) of firm value provides value-relevance data beyond that provided by another, 
using the following regression model: 
MV = a + J3,EBEI + fi^CFO + J3^EVA + s. 
The coefficients estimated from this regression should enable us to test the relevant 
information in respective variable. The results of the regression are presented in 
Table 4.10 and Table 4.11. 
Insert Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 Here 
41 
4.3.2.1 China 
From Table 4.10, we observe that except for industries 3 (公用事業），9 (釀酒食 
品）and 14 (醫藥 ) f o r China, the P-values of EVA were statistically significant 
(<0.0001). The P-values of EBEI fox the China data were also statistically significant 
(<0.0001) except in two industries — industries 3 (公用事業）and 4 ( 化 工 ） 一 
making EBEI a similarly strong value-relevance predictor to firm value as EVA for 
China. On the other hand, the P-values for CFO were statistically significant 
(<0.0001) only in industries 2 (紡織服裝），6 (交通運輸）and 11 (輕工製造） 
for firms in China. Therefore, it seems that CFO is a weaker value-relevance 
predictor to firm value than EBEI and EVA. But to our surprise again, the relation of 
market value and EVA is negative in value. 
Let us have a look at the results that were statistically significant (with P-
value <0.0001). Industries 1 (電子通訊）,8 (能源電力）and 9 (釀酒食品）had 
the highest estimated EBEI coefficient value. Industry 2 (紡織服裝 )had the 
lowest estimated EBEI coefficient value. 
Industries 6 (紡織服裝），11 (輕工製造）and 2 (紡織服裝）had the 
highest estimated CFO coefficient value. Industry 8 (能源電力）had the lowest 
estimated CFO coefficient value. This result is significant in the set using dataset 
similar to that of Hong Kong data, but not significant in the set using all available 
data. The estimated CFO coefficient was even negative in both dataset. 
Industries 6 (交通運輸），13 (冶金）and 15 (重工製造）had the highest 
(or least negative) estimated EVA coefficient. Industries 10 (農林牧漁），7 (金融 
地產）and 16 (,綜合）had the lowest (or most negative) estimated EVA coefficient. 
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4.3.2.2 Hong Kong 
From Table 4.11, we observe that the P-values of EVA for all Hong Kong industries 
were smaller than 0.0001. However, the P-values of EBEI were less then 0.0001 in 
only three industries — industries 3 (Properties), 4 (Consolidated Enterprises) and 5 
(Industrials) — making it a less strong value-relevance predictor to firm value as 
EVA. On the other hand, the P-values for CFO were statistically significant (<0.0001) 
only in industry 4 (Consolidated Enterprises) for Hong Kong data. Again, we 
observe the relationship between market value and EVA is negative. 
Let us take a look at the Hong Kong data that were statistically significant. 
Industries 3 (Properties) and 4 (Consolidated Enterprises) had the highest estimated 
EBEI coefficient value. Industry 5 (Industrials) had the lowest estimated EBEI 
coefficient value. 
Industry 4 (Consolidated Enterprises) was the only industry with a 
significant CFO coefficient value, and the coefficient was negative in value. 
Industries 5 (Industrials) and 3 (Properties) had the highest (or least negative) 
estimated EVA coefficient. Industries 2 (Utilities) and 1 (Finance) had the lowest (or 
most negative) estimated EVA coefficient. 
4.3.3 Discussions 
We can see that the coefficients of all the three predictors were statistically 
significant for at least one industry in China and Hong Kong. This suggests that all 
three predictors do contain at least some information content. But it seems that the 
evidence of information content for CFO is weaker than that of EBEI and EVA. Also 
the evidence of information content for EVA seems to be more consistent in the two 
markets. This suggests EVA is a strong value-relevance predictor to firm value, 
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although the empirical results indicated that the relation of market value and EVA is 
negative in value. From the above results, it is not surprising that one might ask the 
following question: Why did the EVA have negative correlation with market value 
in Hong Kong and China markets? 
Theoretically, EVA is much better than conventional measures in explaining 
the market value of a company. Positive EVA builds up a premium to the market 
value of equity, since investors pay for the excess return. Negative EVA builds up a 
discount to the market value of equity. In reality, there are many companies selling 
below the book value because of insufficient expected return. Young and O'Byrne 
(2001) stated that a company can increase EVA by achieving (1) increase returns on 
existing capital, (2) profitable growth, (3) divestment of value-destroying activities, 
(4) longer periods over which it is expected to earn a returns on net assets greater 
than the cost of capital, and (5) reductions in the cost of capital. These achievements 
create value, and should increase the market value of the company as well as 
increase EVA. 
Therefore, EVA should have positive correlation with market value. Our 
empirical results, however, revealed that all industries in both Hong Kong and China 
had negative estimated EVA coefficient when regressed on market value. Some 
possible explanations are provided as follows. 
4.3.3.1 China 
In our opinion, the cheap and unsecuritized loans that were easily available to SOEs 
and other company owners or managers with "guanxi" connections may have been 
at least part of the reasons of the negative correlation of EVA and market value in 
China markets. 
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As the SOEs and other company owners or managers with "guanxi" 
connections could access the bank loans at low cost and easily, they would borrow 
recklessly and invest in projects or subsidiaries that earn accounting profit, but suffer 
economic loss, and expand the companies. As the companies expand, they would 
have more chances to channel funds to themselves and their crones through fraud, 
corruption, and other lending irregularities. 
The market value of the companies would increase as long as the outsiders 
did not know what was happening in the companies, but these actions are value 
destructing, and result in negative EVA. As a result, the market value may go in 
opposite direction at the EVA in these cases. 
4.3.3.2 Hong Kong 
In our opinion, the abilities to expropriate outsiders (include minority share-holders, 
creditors and others) may have been at least part of the reasons of the negative 
correlation of EVA and market value in Hong Kong market. As they may be able to 
get capital from shareholder and creditors that are outsiders to their family, and 
expand the family business by investing in projects or subsidiaries that earn 
accounting profit, but suffer economic loss. 
The market value of the companies would increase as long as the outsiders 
did not aware of the expropriation, but these actions are value destructing, and result 
in negative EVA. As a result, the market value may go in opposite direction at the 
EVA in these cases. 
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Table 4.1 ： Estimates of the beta and the cost of capital for different industries, as 
well as the market risk premium, in China and Hong Kong 
China (1993-2000) 
Industry B ^ Cost of Capital (%) 
1 (電子通訊） 1.27728 31.9246 
2 (紡織服裝） 1.04332 27.7379 
3 (公用事業） 1.00412 27.0364 
4 (化工） 1.15764 29.7837 
5 (建材建築） 1.03835 27.6490 
6 (交通運輸） 1.18539 30.2803 
7 (金融地產） 1.28618 32.0839 
8 (能源電力） 1.00018 26.9659 
9 (釀酒食品） 1.00106 26.9816 
10 (農林牧漁） 1.18981 30.3594 
11 (輕工製造） 0.97962 26.5980 
12 (商貿旅游） 1.13343 29.3504 
13 (冶金） 1.10292 28.8044 
14 (醫藥） 1.05426 27.9337 
15 (重工製造） 1.05575 27.9603 
16 (綜合） 1.05787 27.9983 
Market Risk Premium (%) 17.8952 
Hong Kong (1990-1999) 
Industry Beta Cost of Capital (%) 
1 (Finance) 0.96229 28.6417 
2 (Utilities) 0.70588 23.2670 
3 (Properties) 1.31920 36.1229 
4 (Consolidated 1.05609 30.6078 
Enterprises) 
5 (Industrials) 1.00810 29.6019 
6 (Hotels) 0.90343 27.4079 
7 (Others) 1.23862 34.4338 
Market Risk Premium (%) 20.9611 
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Table 4.2: The average annual INCAP, NOP AT and EVA for firms listed in China 
(in thousands of RMB) 
Panel A: Using all available data 
Year INCAP NOPAT EVA 
1993 399,562 68,495 -50,693 
(961,930) (122,451) (210,823) 
1994 445,453 69,641 -67,936 
(924,221) (132,885) (184,571) 
1995 454,635 62,760 -79,767 
(891,895) (139,158) (204,061) 
1996 515,110 59,697 -98,958 
(970,937) (105,462) (264,853) 
1997 579,050 62,314 -108,551 
(996,172) (115,918) (274,471) 
1998 645,934 81,468 -95,130 
(1,202,545) (169,718) (330,182) 
1999 689,146 92,607 -85,884 
(1,124,542) (171,351) (242,339) 
2000 992,331 124,697 -131,975 
(7,164,491) (860,400) (1,074,518) 
Panel B: Using data similar to that used for Hong Kong 
Year INCAP NOPAT EVA 
1993 424,161 70,159 -56,337 
(1,038,957) (126,623) (229,569) 
1994 476,362 70,405 -76,729 
(992,106) (134,272) (202,276) 
1995 492,951 65,047 -89,478 
(956,148) (145,659) (214,871) 
1996 559,576 63,772 -108,589 
(1,039,180) (110,938) (273,653) 
1997 632,789 66,239 -120,492 
(1,078,905) (118,768) (290,474) 
1998 708,206 85,643 -107,887 
(1,296,834) (169,567) (342,306) 
1999 773,021 108,395 -91,735 
(1,246,303) (176,089) (248,634) 
2000 1,134,486 135,672 -157,657 
(8,240,630) (932,256) (1,282,030) 
Note: The standard deviations of INCAP, NOPAT and EVA are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4.3: The average annual INCAP, NOP AT and EVA for firms listed in Hong 
Kong (in thousands of HKD) 
Year INCAP NOPAT EVA 
1990 3,563,037 433,296 -703,958 
(9,596,500) (1,180,761) (2,041,385) 
1991 3,866,916 454,316 -759,505 
(10,583,942) (1,360,751) (2,338,351) 
1992 4,203,090 478,410 -734,120 
(11,679,880) (1,376,629) (2,367,999) 
1993 6,163,704 656,266 -1,127,722 
(18,422,649) (1,981,614) (4,060,275) 
1994 4,999,794 678,966 -865,288 
(17,270,122) (2,151，690) (3，775,785) 
1995 5,728,116 665,102 -1,146,127 
(20,762,533) (2,251,383) (4,924,132) 
1996 6,123,494 700,226 -1,203,793 
(20,528,418) (2,496,985) (4,454,993) 
1997 7,144,552 804,236 -1,408,008 
(23,913,676) (2,558,827) (5,253,909) 
1998 5,333,349 588,455 -1,056,008 
(21,935,340) (2,204,867) (5,056,739) 
1999 5,959,362 1,016,155 —819,410 
(23,446,928) (5,502,636) (2,830,033) 
Note: The standard deviations of INCAP, NOPAT and EVA are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4.4: The average annual INCAP, NOPAT and EVA for firms listed in China 
by industry (in thousands of RMB) 
Panel A: Using all available data 
Industry INCAP NOPAT EVA 
1 ( 電 子 通 訊 ) 585,194 81,068 -97,959 
(697,295) (143,745) (195,431) 
2 (紡織服裝） 762，206 86,898 -116,737 
(1,307,171) (168,669) (294,910) 
3 (公用事業） 1，918,092 218,242 -280,842 
(1,953,186) (380,162) (487,543) 
4 (化工） 1，253,443 118,634 -242,602 
(2,519,485) (243,273) (559,350) 
5 (建材建築） 591，436 69,844 -84,070 
(402,987) (86,791) (124,956) 
6 (交通運輸） 1,241,832 160,198 —189,965 
(2,985,519) (231,685) (706,422) 
7 (金融地產） 840,388 102,233 -163,058 
(849,802) (183,016) (251,228) 
8 (能源電力） 1，544,148 287,227 -112,861 
(1,726,536) (447,970) (276,155) 
9 (釀酒食品） 628,321 114,374 -44,905 
(595,202) (137,078) (171,483) 
10 (農林牧漁） 555,246 64,632 —94,815 
(451,491) (87,061) (142,906) 
11 (輕工製造） 706,771 88,297 -91,171 
(562,391) (176,057) (191,053) 
12 (商貿旅游） 467,049 55,096 -75,494 
(421,584) (76,631) (119,533) 
13 (冶金） 1，545，029 136,263 -292,834 
(2,406,103) (200,736) (617,775) 
14 (醫藥） 529,733 74,800 -64,425 
(597,277) (85,144) (107,746) 
15 (重工製造） 897,446 100,305 -140,140 
(879,006) (159,570) (211,082) 
16 (綜合） 541,794 53,913 -90,802 
(490,305) (109,589) (152,029) 
Note: The standard deviations of INCAP, NOPAT and EVA are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Using data similar to that used for Hong Kong 
Industry INCAP NOPAT EVA 
1 (電子通訊） 518,513 75,521 -83,368 
(597,363) (139,949) (178,942) 
2 (紡織服裝） 690,524 79,557 -105,511 
(1,249,783) (155,816) (296,227) 
3 (公用事業） 1,686，792 212,403 -227,992 
(1,621,720) (375,049) (465,546) 
4 (化工） 1，142,113 112,630 -216,891 
(2,337,959) (242,192) (515,097) 
5 (建材建築） 541,479 62,983 -77,970 
(373,402) (87,630) (120,944) 
6 (交通運輸） 1,120,867 147,880 -168,380 
(2,719,950) (210,542) (664,814) 
7 (金融地產） 759，878 93,434 -146,293 
(740,549) (180,972) (232,356) 
8 (能源電力） 1,259，693 273,855 -52,812 
(1,378,550) (436,090) (294,146) 
9 (釀酒食品） 581，077 107,456 -40,151 
(527,786) (141,664) (169,302) 
10 (農林牧漁） 488,125 49,116 -91,307 
(367,816) (89,384) (145,643) 
11 (輕工製造） 630，349 80,015 -80,427 
(478,506) (178,074) (193,506) 
12 (商貿旅游） 428,928 49,499 -70,537 
(384,405) (79,051) (119,939) 
13 (冶金） 1,453，946 126,699 -278,140 
(2,340,482) (193,465) (617,095) 
14 (醫藥） 485,556 68,872 -58,896 
(534,301) (80,994) (98,970) 
15 (重工製造） 798，600 89,005 -125,226 
(780,183) (165,057) (206,997) 
16 (綜合） 489,299 46,795 -84,163 
(429,180) (110,889) (149,742) 
Note: the standard deviations of INCAP, NOPAT and EVA are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4.5: The average annual INCAP, NOP AT and EVA for firms listed in Hong 
Kong by industry (in thousands ofHKD) 
Industry INCAP NOPAT EVA 
1 (Finance) 6,852,447 491,684 -1,487,833 
(10,411,853) (1,082,537) (2,803,087) 
2 (Utilities) 38,862,340 2,264,980 -6,742,417 
(48,327,592) (2,834,212) (9,035,533) 
3 (Properties) 8,054,393 1,303,147 -1,585,349 
(20,352,785) (3,161,606) (5,148,701) 
4 (Consolidated 5,489,827 587,190 -1,089,285 
Enterprises) 
(20,548,444) (2,066,197) (4,609,545) 
5 (Industrials) 1,528,622 205,780 -248,328 
(2,891,072) (826,035) (749,575) 
6 (Hotels) 5,761,398 694,096 -886,136 
(5,620,682) (1,335,026) (1,343,148) 
7 (Others) 1,422,935 123,916 -360,253 
(1,480,448) (187,817) (499,030) 
Note: The standard deviations of INCAP, NOPAT and EVA are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4.6: The average annual EBEI and CFO for firms listed in China (in 
thousands of RMB) 
Year EBEI CFO 
1993 81,899 43,431 
(617,118) (145,088) 
1994 76,488 60,092 
(691,859) (218,911) 
1995 65,491 33,215 
(799,798) (193,060) 
1996 48,793 -11,178 
(1,011,185) (219,106) 
1997 51,324 -5,414 
(1,092,362) (234,588) 
1998 44,577 16,783 
(1,193,321) (232,169) 
1999 52,548 71,879 
(1,254,596) (262,905) 
2000 61,487 70,192 
(1,589,712) (295,454) 
Note: The standard deviations of EBEI and CFO are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.7: The average annual EBEI and CFO for firms listed in Hong Kong (in 
thousands ofHKD) 
Year EBEI CFO 
1990 216,926 191,295 
(617,118) (776,695) 
1991 240,764 235,039 
(691,859) (1,098,646) 
1992 269,068 196,916 
(799,798) (631,435) 
1993 329,188 223,167 
(1,011,185) (1,069,512) 
1994 332,185 282,221 
(1,092,362) (1,215,417) 
1995 296,347 226,024 
(1,193,321) (1,334,246) 
1996 310,838 226,900 
(1,254,596) (1,213,240) 
1997 380,164 219,941 
(1,589,712) (2,265,238) 
1998 102,170 344,297 
(1,225,706) (1,578,866) 
1999 183,194 307,460 
(1,175,274) (1,545,235) 
— ^ 
Note: The standard deviations of EBEI and CFO are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.8: The average annual EBEI and CFO for firms listed in China by industry 
(in thousands of RMB) 
Industry EBEI CFO 
1 (電子通訊） 49，164 24,486 
(108,206) (255,955) 
2 (紡織服裝） 54,778 52,657 
(129,181) (245,254) 
3 (公用事業） 135,507 130,530 
(262,029) (351,099) 
4 (化工） 85,929 65,846 
(224,987) (335,300) 
5 (建材建築） 44,181 15,657 
(69,165) (144,284) 
6 (交通運輸） 75,807 158,587 
(116,773) (439,847) 
7 (金融地產） 59，724 -6,526 
(126,415) (209,202) 
8 (能源電力） 177,720 175,230 
(299,9550 (452,642) 
9 (釀酒食品） 92,557 70,690 
(134,971) (162,461) 
10 (農林牧漁） 33,899 21,431 
(85,531) (153,538) 
11 (輕工製造） 58，054 19,639 
(129,144) (252,852) 
12 (商貿旅游） 34,449 23,387 
(72,340) (149,091) 
13 (冶金） 92,961 126,446 
(154,468) (377,696) 
14 (醫藥） 46,569 16,966 
(56,423) (147,146) 
15 (重工製造） 57,320 42,386 
(126,350) (281,210) 
16 (綜合） 29，082 10,440 
(93,094) (177,872) 
Note: The standard deviations of EBEI and CFO are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.9: The average annual EBEI and CFO for firms listed in Hong Kong by 
industry (in thousands of HKD) 
Industry EBEI CFO 
1 (Finance) 96,386 74,254 
(140,952) (182,922) 
2 (Utilities) 2,122,563 2,296,587 
(2.832.570) (3,089,655) 
3 (Properties) 492,055 323,661 
(1.579.571) (1,776,616) 
4 (Consolidated Enterprises) 246,221 233,190 
(1,010,728) (1,335,113) 
5 (Industrials) 83,909 74,317 
(255,692) (321,958) 
6 (Hotels) 154,784 166,160 
(343,929) (434,568) 
7 (Others) 56,672 46,124 
(94,654) (131,837) 
Note: The standard deviations of EBEI and CFO are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.10: Regression of various measures on market value for firms listed in 
China 
Panel A: Using all available data 
Industry Intercept EBEI C ^ EVA 
1 (電子通訊） 1607731 24.6721 -0.23913 -5.06216 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.6369) (<0.0001) 
2 (紡織服裝） 1304560 6.08882 2.41374 -3.89682 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
3 (公用事業） 1636486 15.5917 2.44536 -4.34140 
(0.0461) (0.0002) (0.3474) (0.0018) 
4 (化工） 1646124 1.98330 0.60956 -5.70164 , 
(<0.0001) (0.0451) (0.2975) (<0.0001) 
5 (建材建築） 951297 16.8008 0.48992 -5.71947 ：；1 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.4540) (<0.0001) 
6 (交通運輸） 943487 18.7937 3.65102 -2.93792 
(0.0013) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
7 (金融地產） 705553 16.5381 0.01110 -8.04749 
(0.0010) (<0.0001) (0.9887) (<0.0001) 
8 (能源電力） 832061 24.1735 -3.83362 -4.66824 
(0.0364) (<0.0001) (0.0001) (<0.0001) 
9 (釀酒食品） 1399617 19.7473 0.56449 -2.01041 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.6052) (0.0414) 
10 (農林牧漁） 1243141 12.8917 3.24598 -9.96867 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0040) (<0.0001) 
11 (輕工製造） 1104720 13.8319 3.09491 -6.78385 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
12 (商貿旅游） 866188 12.5454 0.74288 -6.48790 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0342) (<0.0001) 
13 (冶金） 1485798 9.56944 2.64487 -3.05585 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0015) (<0.0001) 
14 (醫藥） 1306052 16.1157 0.44542 -4.57843 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.5936) (<0.0001) 
15 (重工製造） 1523341 11.3222 0.84419 -2.69814 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0164) (<0.0001) 
16 (綜合） 1060954 16.7278 -0.22672 -7.36384 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.5768) (<0.0001) 
Note: the P-value of Intercept, EBEI, CFO and EVA estimate are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
Panel B: Using data similar to that used for Hong Kong 
Industry Intercept EBEI OTO EVA 
1 (電子通訊） 1566804 25.51720 -0.19409 -5.92744 
(<0.0001) (O.OOOl) (0.7002) (<0.0001) 
2 (紡織服裝） 1366604 5.90334 2.53440 —3.75950 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
3 (公用事業） 1592442 16.94985 2.25737 -4.84137 
(0.0578) (0.0001) (0.3885) (0.0022) 
4 (化工） 1660087 2.56328 0.61739 -6.08099 
(<0.0001) (0.0080) (0.2862) (<0.0001) 
5 (建材建築） 919712 17.49868 0.49871 -6.17482 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.4456) (<0.0001) 
6 (交通運輸） 993172 18.49447 3.90779 -2.91239 
(0.0011) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
7 (金融地產） 669791 17.94121 0.02856 -8.64218 
(0.0028) (<0.0001) (0.9719) (<0.0001) 
8 (能源電力） 801448 25.48766 -3.75194 -5.86246 
(0.0276) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
9 (釀酒食品） 1287092 20.68097 0.54537 -2.93257 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.6110) (0.0054) 
10 (農林牧漁） 1249433 15.43027 0.96497 -9.87563 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.3758) (<0.0001) 
11 (輕工製造） 1111719 14.48592 3.19939 -7.10550 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
12 (商貿旅游） 840892 13.41578 0.80960 -6.85518 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0204) (<0.0001) 
13 (冶金） 1495977 10.04269 2.53090 -3.07434 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0025) (<0.0001) 
14 (醫藥） 1296638 16.79341 0.42384 -4.63843 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.6156) (0.0002) 
15 (重工製造） 1400983 12.38430 0.80048 -3.52523 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0197) (<0.0001) 
16 (綜合） 963398 18.44551 0.03565 -8.47777 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9296) (<0.0001) 
Note: The P-value of Intercept, EBEI, CFO and EVA estimate are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4.11: Regression of various measures on market value for firms listed in 
Hong Kong 
Industry Intercept EBEI CFO EVA 
1 (Finance) -193626 12.89864 4.20972 —3.20166 
(0.7042) (0.0168) (0.2701) (<0.0001) 
2 (Utilities) 97367 3.10038 0.86068 -4.19724 
(0.9371) (0.1117) (0.6134) (<0.0001) 
3 (Properties) 320498 4.61168 -0.52694 —1.99774 
(0.1040) (<0.0001) (0.0011) (<0.0001) 
4 (Consolidated Enterprises) 280371 3.94672 -0.40276 一2.72767 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
5 (Industrials) 182957 3.47801 0.50890 -1.91462 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0003) (<0.0001) 
6 (Hotels) 919193 2.78683 2.43902 -2.26865 
(<0.0001) (0.0131) (0.0067) (<0.0001) 
7 (Others) 126198 -0.09899 2.36265 -2.31566 
(0.2424) (0.9321) (0.0057) (<0.0001) 
m • — _ _ — I . 1 … ” • • • ••” I • _ I … — I •!• I I • • • I ••丨•  I •!• I"II HI —I r i-- iMiin»i p Mf^ ™— 
Note: The P-value of Intercept, EBEI, CFO and EVA estimate are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 4.1: The average annual INCAP, NOPAT and EVA for firms listed in China 
(in thousands of RMB), 1993-2000 
The average EVA of China listed firms 
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Figure 4.2: The average annual INCAP, NOPAT and EVA for firms listed in Hong 
Kong (in thousands ofHKD), 1990—1999 
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Figure 4.3: Comparing the average annual EVA of China and Hong Kong. 
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Figure 4.4: The average annual INCAP, NOPAT and EVA for firms listed in China 
by industry (in thousands ofRMB), 1993-2000. 
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Figure 4.5: The average annual INCAP, NOP AT and EVA for firms listed in Hong 
Kong by industry (in thousands ofRMB), 1990-1999. 
The average EVA of different Industry in Hong Kong 
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Figure 4.6: The average annual EBEI and CFO for firms listed in China (in 
thousands ofRMB), 1993-2000. 
The average EBEI and CFO of China listed company 
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Figure 4.7: The average annual EBEI and CFO for firms listed in Hong Kong (in 
thousands ofHKD), 1990—1999. 
The average EBEI and CFO of Hong Kong listed company 
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Figure 4.8: The average annual EBEI and CFO for firms listed in China by industry 
(in thousands of RMB), 1993-2000. 
The average EBEI and CFO of different Industry in China 
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Figure 4.9: The average annual EBEI and CFO for firms listed in Hong Kong by 
industry (in thousands of HKD), 1990-1999. 
The average EBEI and CFO of different Industry in Hong Kong 
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Chapter 5 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we found that that although the average EBEI and CFO in Hong Kong 
and China markets were positive (except for the average CFO for firms in China 
between 1996 and 1997)，the average EVA in both Hong Kong and China were 
negative. Incidentally, both markets experienced their local minimum points in 
average EVA in the year 1997. We can also see that some industries (for example, 
the utilities industry) had high EBEI and CFO, but low (or more negative) EVA. 
Another interesting finding is that the correlation of the market value and EVA of 
companies were negative. This is contrary to what we had expected, as we expected 
that the (estimated) EVA should be positively correlated with the market value of 
the firm. 
It may be argued that the negative EVA and the negative estimated EVA 
coefficient in China market might due to the weak corporate governance, weak 
financial system and the cheap and unsecuritized loans that were easily available. On 
the other hand, the negative EVA and the negative estimated EVA coefficient in 
Hong Kong market might due to the family enterprises, formation of extensive 
corporate pyramids, and the abilities to expropriate outsiders. 
It seemed that the reasons in two markets were different, but there are also 
some similarities. In both markets, managers could not be disciplined by the 
takeover market as in U.S. Also, the managers could make the others pay for results 
of the value destructing actions in both markets. The Hong Kong and China markets 
provided some interesting insight to the use of EVA as a performance measures in 
markets with difference governance mechanism. The results in our study also made 
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us wonder if the negative EVA that both markets had experienced before the Asian 
financial crisis were indicators of the financial crisis. 
Of course, this study is not without its limitations. We had not differentiated 
firms with different structure of corporate governance. We just implicitly assumed 
that the main corporate governance structure in China market is state-owned, and the 
main corporate governance structure in Hong Kong market is family-control. So we 
suggest further study in the Hong Kong and China market that focus on the 
relationship between the structure of corporate governance and the value creation 
and enhancement measured by EVA and related metrics. We could differentiate the 
firms by ownership concentration ratio. Then, we can examine effects on a firm's 
performance of various ownership mix, such as corporation ownership versus 
individual ownership in Hong Kong, or state ownership and legal person ownership 
versus individual ownership in China. 
The opinion that the negative EVA may be indicators of the financial crisis 
also raises another question: if the negative EVA is an indicator of financial crisis, 
then why did Hong Kong and China seem to have survived the worst of the crisis 
while the other economies of East and Southeast Asia were crashed? In an attempt to 
answer this question, Sharma (2000) believed that the reasons for China market's 
survive are as follows: 
1. The requirement that those who wanted to buy or sell foreign exchange or 
foreign currency denominated financial assets to enter the exchange market 
which operated through designated banks gave the PBOC greater flexibility 
in responding to balance-of-payments problems. The partial convertibility of 
the Renmibi had made it extremely difficult to place large leveraged bets for 
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or against the currency and rendered the RMB far less vulnerable to domestic 
or externally driven speculative attacks. 
2. Approximately 70% of capital flow to China was in the form of foreign 
direct investment by mid-1997, with their much longer-term maturities and 
manageable debt-service ratios, provides far more stability and is less 
susceptible to sudden reversals in direction due to negative monetary shock 
or investor panic and made China less vulnerable to a speculation-led 
liquidity crisis. 
3. Approximately 90% of China's external debt was primarily medium to long-
term, so foreign lenders could not call in their loans every three to six months. 
Such relative stability greatly reduced the possibility of an immediate 
banking crisis. 
4. China's healthy current account surpluses (some $30 billion), massive trade 
surpluses, and a formidable "war chest" in foreign exchange reserves 
(totaling some $150 billion in 1999), reduced the pressure to devalue the 
currency or raise interest rates. 
But is it possible that China and Hong Kong markets had less negative EVA 
than the other East and Southeast Asia? We think that it would be interesting to see 
whether EVA could predict or explain which market is the survivor to a financial 
crisis. Further study in other market in East and Southeast Asian (for example, 
Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia) is definitely warranted. Specifically, 
one should compile the data on EVA and related metrics for the firms in these 
markets in a similar method as in this study, and compare the results with the Hong 
Kong and China market. 
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